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Chapter Learning Outcomes 
Upon completion of this chapter, readers will be able to: 
1. Identify questions about value associated with the pursuit of knowledge and justified belief. 
2. Critically evaluate claims about epistemic entitlement, claims such as that a person’s beliefs or 
attitudes are either responsibly or irresponsibly held. 
3. Demonstrate analytic writing and reasoning skills in articulating philosophical concepts of 
epistemic “value,” “duty,” and “virtue”/“vice.” 
 
Epistemic Value and the Value Problem 
You need very much to go to Larissa but do not know the way. If you asked one who knows, we can 
agree this person would be a good guide. But what about one who has “a true opinion about which way 
is the right way,” but who hasn’t gone there and isn’t directly acquainted with the path? Socrates asks 
his friend Meno, in the Platonic dialogue by that name, whether such a person with “right opinion 
concerning that which other people know … will not be a worse guide than one who knows.” Meno 
concurs that this person would not be a worse guide, for the conveyed belief, or guidance, would be 
essentially the same. But upon receiving this response, Socrates observes an oddity: if true belief can 
serve just as well our practical purpose of successfully guiding action, then why do we value knowledge 
over true belief? Indeed, why (and how) do we try to distinguish knowledge from merely true belief?1   
 
These searching questions leave Meno in the uncomfortable, perplexed 
state of mind the Greeks termed aporia. Meno now seems to be 
without resources to answer Socrates’ initial question about the nature 
of knowledge. But Socrates immediately offers Meno a way out. It 
seems correct that an assertion or transmitted belief, insofar as it is 
true, would serve practical ends as well as would knowledge. But for 
the testifier in our example the belief lacks justification, and in sharing 
it that testifier would be “offering guess-work in lieu of knowledge.” If 
we abstract from the single-iteration cases in which the belief happens 
to be true, we find that relying upon luck, guesswork, or weakly 
supported beliefs is quite unlikely to serve well. If so based, our own 
beliefs are not likely to “stay put” even for us. So, “True opinions, for as 
long as they remain, are fine things and do nothing but good. But they 
don’t hang around for long; they escape from a man's mind, so that 
they are not worth much until one tethers them” with a logos or 
“account” (Plato 2002, 97–98).  
Socrates does not say much about the nature of this logos, whether it is good reasons for one’s belief 
that an agent finds available upon self-reflection, or something more like an explanation which makes 
salient why the belief was reliably formed in the agent, such that their having come to hold this true 
belief, rather than some other false belief, is not merely a matter of extreme good luck. But it is clear, 
firstly, that Socrates is talking about something like “justification” or “warrant,” to use terms debated in 
contemporary epistemology (see Chapter 2 of this volume, “Epistemic Justification” by Todd R. Long). 
Secondly, it is clear that he takes this “tying” or “chaining down” of the belief by a logos, and the 
resulting stability it enjoys, to both provide what differentiates knowledge from true belief, and at the 
same time to affirm why it is not mistaken that we should value knowledge above merely true belief. 
Hence, Plato is seen as a source of the traditional, justified true belief analysis of knowledge (or JTB 
account; see Chapter 1 of this volume, “The Analysis of Knowledge” by Brian C. Barnett).  
 
The sufficiency of this traditional analysis has been challenged in recent years, and some have 
questioned even the necessity of reflective justification for knowledge possession. But we owe Plato (c. 
428–347 BCE) for having vividly presented the concern about what we mean in attributing knowledge to 
someone, together with a question about why we value different 
epistemic standings as we do. While the value problem as just 
introduced is understood and answered in different ways by 
proponents of different accounts of our epistemic aims, facing 
these questions head on has arguably added much depth to 
contemporary epistemological debates. It has helped the field to 
expand beyond a mere spectator theory of knowledge, which John 
Dewey2 (Later Works 4.19) characterized as an account which 
makes the metaphor of vision primary, such that knowing is 
fundamentally a passive, or "beholding" relation between an 
individual “subject” knower and an external “object” known. For as 
Alvin Goldman points out, while a few decades ago epistemology 
and ethics were “positioned in opposite corners of the 
philosophical establishment, the former the epitome of 
‘theoretical’ philosophy and the latter the epitome of ‘practical’ 
philosophy, with little contact made between them, today an active 
interest in both analogies and disanalogies between ethics and 
epistemology abounds” (Goldman 2015, 132–3).3  
A "normative" task is one that does not aim at description or causal explanation, but rather at 
assessment or guidance of some kind, according to values (norms) deemed pertinent to some practice 
(the value of art or particular artworks, for example), or the domain of discourse (ethics, politics, 
economics, epistemics, aesthetics, etc.). What has been discovered—or perhaps recovered—through 
recent interest in the value problem is that normative epistemology and normative ethics have 
important parallels. This is why duty, consequentialist, and virtue theories in ethics each have analogues 
in contemporary epistemological theories.4 The study of epistemological axiology helps to highlight the 
similarities of ethical and epistemic evaluation, but also the differences. Moreover, similarities or 
analogies imply something quite different from identity: their claim is weaker than the claim that we can 
reduce the one kind of value to the other. The value problem is best addressed by carefully 
distinguishing the kinds of value in play, rather than reducing value to a single kind. So, Duncan Pritchard 
insists that to understand and respond to the problem we first recognize that different kinds of value 
(epistemic, ethical, practical) are in play.  
The claim of veritism (or T-monism) is that truth is the natural aim of belief, and true belief is the 
fundamental epistemic good. While truth is, as on the traditional account, a condition on knowledge, 
the value of truth is not grounded in knowledge or anything else. Other epistemic states or standings are 
good as they promote the epistemic value of true belief. T-monism has many critics as well as 
defenders. Linda Zagzebski (1996) for example argues that (externalist) reliabilism offers an inadequate 
account of epistemological axiology, or epistemic value. Pritchard, although he defends reliabilism and 
T-monism, makes the useful methodological point that authors on both sides of the debate are 
sometimes guilty of confusing “epistemic value” (associated with truth or other epistemic ends) with 
“the value of the epistemic” (the instrumental value of holding true beliefs, knowledge, understanding, 
etc., for realizing our moral or practical ends).5 Epistemic value does not imply value proper, or value for 
life (Pritchard 2014, 112).6 
 
Opposed to epistemic value monism is epistemic value pluralism. This 
axiological thesis denies the T-monist claim that the natural aim of 
belief is truth. The pluralist finds no straightforward hierarchy among 
epistemic goods, but rather an un-unified order of values. A Jamesian 
point often discussed as a challenge to veritism is that “truth” as the 
fundamental epistemic good is ambiguous between a positive and 
negative good: “Believe truth! Shun error!” (James, Section VII, 18).7 
Seen as prescribing how to conduct inquiry, these two commands are 
not the same.8 If, instead of marching in lockstep they can sometimes 
come apart, leading to different prescriptions, then the epistemic good 
of true belief is not as unified as it may at first appear.9 Further, if there 
is no single best way for agents to balance these two ideals of inquiry 
(the councils of intellectual courage and of caution, as William James 
describes them), then recognition of the range of ways to achieve a 
balance becomes an argument in support of the possibility of 
reasonable disagreement even among evidence-sharing epistemic 
peers (Kelly 2013). 
Critics of veritism have either (a) maintained a monism but elevated to final value status a different aim, 
such as understanding; or (b) jettisoned monism’s “primary aim” thesis in order to embrace “radical 
pluralism about both the nature of the epistemic and about epistemic value” (Pritchard 2014). On this 
latter, pluralist view, “there is no base-level account of the epistemic available, and nor is there a 
fundamental epistemic good—i.e., fundamental in the sense that the epistemic value of other epistemic 
goods is reducible to the fundamental epistemic good.” Here we are presented with a smorgasbord of 
the epistemically desirable—truth, knowledge, understanding, wisdom, justification, reliability, cognitive 
agency, explanatory power, and so on—but “with no straightforward hierarchy in play.”10  
 
The Ethics of Belief 
The ethics of belief raises questions of our responsibility (praiseworthiness or blameworthiness) for how 
we conduct our inquiries and settle our beliefs. It is a broad and perhaps ambiguous term, which 
Andrew Chignell (2018) describes as referring to a cluster of questions at the intersection of 
epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, and psychology. Susan Haack (2001) defends an Overlap 
model relating epistemic and ethical evaluation. On this model we should not reduce epistemic value to 
ethical values; but having first properly differentiated them, we can then go on to acknowledge a good 
deal of overlap or traffic between them. Moral responsibility is widely held to have an epistemic 
condition, the failing of which is the reason why not knowing something, when the ignorance is non-
culpable, is generally an excusing condition for one’s wrongful action.11 Doxastic responsibility, the kind 
of responsibility one has for what they believe, seems similarly to draw from the other side, in that even 
though we lack the direct control over our beliefs that we often have over our actions, we have enough 
indirect control over how well or poorly we inquire that some portion of our beliefs are subject to moral 
evaluation.  
Haack argues that the portion of our beliefs which are properly 
censured on moral grounds is substantially smaller than the full set of 
our epistemically unjustified beliefs. For there are numerous cases 
where one’s belief may lack epistemic justification, but where the 
agent is not vicious or blameworthy for believing something on scanty 
evidence. This may occur because the person’s believing something 
unjustifiedly is due to “cognitive inadequacy” and does not involve 
willed ignorance, negligence, or the covert (self-deceptive) operation 
of hopes or fears. To show this, Haack revisits the classic debate 
between the evidentialist William Clifford and the permissivist William 
James.12 The focus of James’ rebuttal of Clifford (highlighted in Table 1 
below) was the latter’s bold, impermissivist claim:13 
Clifford's Principle: “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to 
believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”  
 
It is clear that Clifford’s presupposed sense of “wrongness” in Clifford’s Principle is an ethical sense. But 
the idea of doxastic responsibility, and accordingly, of projects of guidance, also raise issues about 
“ought implies can” (control as a precondition of responsibility) and about the degree of control humans 
have over their doxastic attitudes: If all beliefs are completely involuntary, it would hardly make sense to 
speak of doxastic responsibility. That we are responsible for our actions does not mean we are 
responsible for, or can change our beliefs in just the same way. This would likely be false. Differences 
over these issues help explain why debate over the ethics of belief often involves competing models of 
the relationship between epistemic, ethical, and pragmatic value. But Haack (21) provides a quite 
helpful taxonomy of five models of the relationship between ethical and epistemic evaluation:14  
(1) that epistemic appraisal is a subspecies of ethical appraisal—henceforth, for short, the Special-
Case Thesis; 
(2) that positive/negative epistemic appraisal is distinct from, but invariably associated with, 
positive/negative ethical appraisal—the Correlation Thesis; 
(3) that there is, not invariable correlation, but partial overlap, where positive/negative epistemic 
appraisal is associated with positive/negative ethical appraisal—the Overlap Thesis; 
(4) that ethical appraisal is inapplicable where epistemological appraisal is relevant—the 
Independence Thesis; 
(5) that epistemic appraisal is distinct from, but analogous to, ethical appraisal—the Analogy Thesis. 
Haack’s taxonomy brings a good deal of clarity to an oft-
muddled debate. Zagzebski’s early “pure virtue theory” is a clear 
instance of the Special-Case Thesis. Clifford can be seen to 
presuppose the Correlation Thesis in coining the term “ethics of 
belief,” yet other evidentialists like Trent Dougherty (2014) 
criticize that thesis and appear to endorse the Independence 
Thesis instead.15 The Overlap Thesis is the most plausible 
according to Haack, who goes on to argue that it helps to clarify 
and properly restrict the domain in which instances of believing 
may be judged on ethical as well as epistemic grounds. Clifford’s 
Principle presupposes the Correlation Thesis: It assumes, Haack 
points out, that “whenever a person believes unjustifiedly, his so 
believing is always also subject, all things considered, to 
unfavorable moral appraisal” (24). But, Haack argues “there is, 
not an invariable correlation, but partial overlap, where 
positive/negative epistemic appraisal is associated with 
positive/negative ethical appraisal” (129). “Unlike the correlation thesis, which requires that unjustified 
believing be always (at least prima facie) harmful and always something for which the subject may 
properly be held responsible, the overlap thesis requires only that unjustified believing sometimes 
causes (at least prima facie) harm and sometimes be something for which the subject may properly be 
held responsible” (125).  
Haack’s application of the Overlap Thesis to the ethics of belief functions by (a) restricting the domain in 
which instances of believing may be judged on ethical as well as epistemic grounds; by (b) identifying 
circumstances that serve to exonerate individuals from unfortunate epistemic failures; and by (c) 
distinguishing appraisals of character from epistemic and ethical appraisal, and role-specific 
responsibilities from those more generally appropriate to all of us.16 
This approach arguably delivers an ethics of belief that is moderately 
permissivist and supportive of William James’ plea for a “spirit of inner 
toleration” and of what the political philosopher John Rawls17 (1921–
2002) termed “reasonable pluralism.” Barring more specific 
objections, Rawls’ form of belief permissivism can agree with Thomas 
Jefferson in Notes on the State of Virginia [Query XVII, “Religion”], 
when he held, “It does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are 
twenty gods or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.” 
This is an advantage in that we are not bound to over-easily associate 
disagreement with error or irrationality. The view also appreciates the 
holistic and trait-dependent reasoning that attends our deepest-held 
or “worldview” beliefs—the many different kinds of evidence and the 
many contextual factors including upbringing or early educational 
influences. These tend to weigh heavily upon reasoning in the 
domains of morals, politics, philosophy, and religion, which are 
referred to in the literature as domains of controversial views. But 
another advantage is that this approach remains concerned as was Clifford with the many harms and 
injustices that bias-mirroring us/them or ingroup/outgroup beliefs, as a prime example, inflict upon 
others. It remains what I call a permissive yet risk aware ethics of belief (Axtell 2020).  
This leads directly to our next topic, but the ethics of belief remains a topic of lively debate, so I 
conclude our discussion of it with a table describing the key issues and arguments between Cliffordian 
moral evidentialism and proponents of a more permissive ethics of belief, as James presented them in 
his famous 1896 paper “The Will to Believe.” James was primarily intending to rebut Clifford’s maxim as 
it appears to demand agnosticism (belief withholding or suspension) in a wide range of cases, and to 
rule out virtuous faith ventures including belief in a broad, philosophically stated “religious hypothesis.” 
 
 Table 1 – William James’ “The Will to Believe”18 
             The Evidentialist as “Faith Vetoer”               The Jamesian Believer 
A. Primary Aim  
 
Avoid believing what is false! Believe what is true! 
B. Risk of Losing 
the Truth 
 
Remaining in ignorance; through 
skeptical paralysis, never coming to 
believe something that is true. 
Falling into error; through credulous manner 





Evidential reasoning should always 
prevail in our deliberations:  
“The rightness or wrongness of belief in 
a doctrine (proposition) depends only 
upon the nature of the evidence for it, 
and not upon what the doctrine is” 
(Clifford, EOB 102). Stated negatively, “It 
is wrong, always, everywhere, and for 
anyone, to believe anything upon 
insufficient evidence” (EOB 77). 
 
In specific instances, pragmatic reasoning 
should be treated as a normal element in 
making up our minds:  
“The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: 
Our passional nature not only lawfully may, 
but must, decide an option between 
propositions, whenever it is a genuine option 
that cannot by its nature be decided on 
intellectual grounds” (James, WB, Sec. IV). 
 
D. Applied 
to the Religious 
Hypothesis (RH) 
Withhold assent to the RH, as to more 
particular overbeliefs, until sufficient 
evidence is present. An agnostic stance 
of suspension is uniquely rational, and 
deontologically required. 
 
“The lawfulness of voluntarily adopted 
faith,” since the option between the 
alternatives of accepting or doing without 
the RH are argued to meet the conditions of 




Public duty: There is a public duty to 
withhold assent, based on harm done by 
irresponsible and dishonest habits of 
belief-acquisition. 
Private right: There is a private right to “faith 
ventures,” and there is value in a robust 
marketplace of spiritual and philosophical 
“overbeliefs”; we ought to promote an 








Intellectual Caution: Since “we must 
avoid error,” we should maintain the 
“skeptical balance,” and remain 
uncommitted until sufficient evidence is 
presented either for or against a belief. 
Intellectual Courage: Since “we must know 
the truth” on some questions of existential 
concern, we may have to dare to be wrong. 
Under the conditions of the genuine option, 
we may commit to belief “in advance” of 




Fear: “Better risk loss of truth than 
chance of error, —that is your faith-
vetoer’s exact position” (WB sec. 10). 
[But Clifford would reverse this, with the 
evidentialist exemplifying fearless open 
inquiry into truth, and his opponent fear 
and intellectual dishonesty]. 
Hope: “If religion be true and the evidence 
for it still be insufficient, I do not wish . . . to 
forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon 
the winning side” (WB sec. 10). 
 
 
Virtue & Vice Epistemologies 
Study of the value problem and of epistemological axiology more generally has been part of a broader 
trend that includes the development in recent decades of social, feminist, performance, and virtue 
epistemologies, accounts which themselves display numerous overlaps not just in what epistemological 
views they claim to supersede, but also in what they affirm as the proper scope of normative 
epistemology (see also this volume Chapter 7, “Social Epistemology” by William D. Rowley; Chapter 8, 
“Feminist Epistemologies” by Monica C. Poole). Authors associated with these trends have explored the 
relationship between knowledge and power, the relationship between individual and group knowing, 
and the relationship between coming to know and performing inquiry responsibly. 
Character epistemology, or what has also been called virtue responsibilism, has arguably led to 
expansion of the field of epistemology, whether in the sense of studies independent from but 
complementary to the analysis of knowledge, or as directly or indirectly informing/transforming that 
traditional epistemological project.20 Virtue epistemologies both reliabilist and responsibilist break with 
mid- and late-twentieth century analytic epistemology by making agency and responsibility in inquiry 
primary, and hence also by repatriating diachronic (latitudinal/across time) in contrast with synchronic 
(time-slice) concerns from their unjust banishment from epistemic significance. Heather Battaly and 
others argue that this puts “active” knowledge (or perhaps “reflective” in contrast to “brute” or 
“animal” knowing) back on the epistemological map in a way that simple reliabilism and anti-luck 
epistemologies cannot. Certainly it encourages thick descriptions of particular virtues and vices and their 
effects on inquiry, and on individual and group beliefs.21 Virtues such as intellectual humility have 
received a good deal of attention in character epistemology, along with open-mindedness and others.22  
While most character epistemology has focused on 
virtues (whether in the broader “intellectual” or the 
more restrictive “epistemic” sense), a good deal of 
interest has recently been shown in the complementary 
focus on intellectual vices, often directly informed by 
studies in social and/or cognitive psychology. Quassim 
Cassam’s23 Vices of the Mind: From the Intellectual to 
the Political (2019) somewhat ironically mirrors the title 
of Zagzebski’s Virtues of the Mind (1996), noted for 
having spurred a great deal of initial interest in virtue or 
character epistemology. Cassam defines vice 
epistemology as “the philosophical study of the nature, 
identity, and epistemological significance of intellectual 
vices. Such vices include gullibility, dogmatism, 
prejudice, closed-mindedness, and negligence. These are intellectual character vices, that is, intellectual 
vices that are also character traits.”24  
 
Epistemic Paternalism 
Social epistemology studies how social relationships and interactions affect the epistemic properties of 
individuals, groups, and collectives (see this volume Chapter 7, “Social Epistemology” by William D. 
Rowley). These relationships may include existing or ideal divisions of labor in the search for knowledge, 
and questions of power relations. Social epistemology raises socially significant questions both about 
our epistemic agency in the world, and about the efficacy of our epistemic practices. Some of these 
questions involve the improvability of our habits of inquiry. Education of course offers this, but there is 
controversy about the need and justification for more overt policies or interventions to correct for 
flawed or biased thinking. “Paternalism” is a term referring us to actions or policies intended to aid 
others for their own good, but without their consent. Helmet and seatbelt laws, for example, require 
something of us for our own safety, and we aren’t free just to ignore them. But our inquiry and access to 
information can be similarly interfered with on the paternalistic ground that this is for our own 
epistemic benefit. Indeed, epistemic practices which have a paternalistic profile affect our private and 
public lives, often in ways of which we are not aware. Epistemic paternalism (EP) provides a rationale 
for such interferences; in its primary sense EP is a normative thesis, a thesis of advocacy for (or 
justifiable participation in) some specific interferences or limitations in the ways in which we might seek 
knowledge. Restricted access to information sometimes improves people’s reasoning and supports 
veritistic outcomes, as for instance in “blinded” scientific experiments, and in judicial rules prohibiting 
the disclosure of a defendant’s past criminal profile to a jury. But what entities are entitled to undertake 
a paternalistic practice, and in virtue of which features does such entitlement accrue to them? For 
example, are media sites like Facebook permitted to paternalistically tag or remove “fake news” or 
extreme content? Should they be expected to have policies to filter out certain potentially harmful 
content, and to remediate the ill-effects of “echo chambers” where biased and polarized ideologies are 
fostered? 
 
The debate over justified EP at times leans on interpretation of findings 
in psychology, findings which are often claimed to suggest intractable 
human irrationality, biases, and problematic heuristics. But while 
biased reasoners might be one threat to the legitimacy of democratic 
practices, so might be certain censoring or coercive testimonial 
practices rationalized by the epistemic improvements they promise. So, 
paternalistic epistemic practices and their proper limits are today a 
topic of interest, at least where contemporary social epistemology and 
concerns for political legitimacy overlap. Alvin Goldman25 introduced 
and defended EP early in social epistemology’s emergence (1991). 
While there is an apparent tension between epistemic paternalism and 
epistemic justice, EP’s defenders think that the tension is only 
apparent, and that intelligent interventions can in fact be a form of 
epistemic justice insofar as applications of epistemic paternalism 
respect persons as actual knowers, and facilitate their epistemic 
capacities.  
 
Distinguishing Between Epistemology’s Normative Projects  
Questions about epistemological axiology which interest many philosophers today—questions of what 
epistemic goals there are, and why we value knowledge, understanding, and wisdom—were not always 
considered very central questions in epistemology. The traditional project of the analysis of knowledge 
of course remains one of epistemologists’ primary tasks, but the turn to the study of knowing agents 
(rather than propositions known), and to collectives (rather than just individuals) broadens and 
transforms contemporary normative epistemology. It requires us to rethink issues about how we 
inquire, and about how we should conceive the relationship between epistemic and moral evaluation. 
Thus, epistemologists are increasingly concerned with agency both of individuals and collectives, and 
with thick descriptions of the role of particular virtues and vices (epistemic or moral) in inquiry. 
Contemporary normative epistemology also hosts lively debate over the importance of concepts of 
responsibility, reasonableness, willful ignorance, and epistemic justice/injustice. These and related 
concepts are important for projects of guidance aimed at addressing real-world agents and problems of 
diversity among beliefs: concerns discussed here under the ethics of belief. But these projects of 
guidance or amelioration (improvement of performance) involve human psychology and attention to 
the non-ideal agents we actually are. For these reasons it is important to clearly distinguish the forward-
looking concerns with guidance from the project of conceptual analysis of knowledge. 
 
Questions for Reflection 
1. In what ways is the evaluation of responsible belief similar to the evaluation of responsible action? 
In what ways is the evaluation of belief different from the evaluation of actions? 
 
2. What is the highest epistemic good? Is there one main good, or are there several?  
 
3. How are norms of rationality connected with norms of the ethics of belief? Should our ethics of 
belief be permissive or impermissive? If permissive, does that mean any belief is a reasonable one, 
or are their limits to reasonable belief and reasonable disagreement? 
 
4. William Clifford argued that “It is wrong always, anywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon 
insufficient evidence,” while Thomas Jefferson argued that “It does me no injury for my neighbor to 
say there are twenty gods or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.” Are Clifford the 
evidentialist, and Jefferson the permissivist, speaking about the same kinds of harms? Whose stance 
on the ethics of belief do you most agree with, and why? 
 
5. Is the study of intellectual “virtues” and “vices” valuable? Can such virtues as intellectual humility 
and open-mindedness be taught? Are virtues simply skills, or is there a motivational component to 
virtues that distinguishes their acquisition from, say, acquiring the skills of riding a bike?  
 
6. What examples can you find of epistemic paternalist practices, for instance, in medicine, in the law, 
in education? Are there justified instances of interfering with people’s inquiry without their consent, 
for their own epistemic good, or does the value of personal autonomy always outweigh the interest 
in promoting truth?  
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Belief (im)permissivism: Impermissivist views in the ethics of belief are closely associated with broad 
application of the Rational Uniqueness principle (RU), and permissivist views with the rejection of this 
principle. (RU) holds that for a given set of evidence E and a proposition p, only one doxastic attitude 
about p is rational. Rational agents who share that evidence will hold this single attitude, and none 
other. The issues which divide impermissivists and permissivists are further complicated if one not in 
terms of “belief,” “disbelief” and “suspension,” but in terms of a spectrum of degreed credences. The 
debate is also complicated by questions concerning the legitimacy of “faith-based” belief as indicating 
something quite different from everyday belief, or belief based upon inference from logically sufficient 
evidence. Clifford’s Principle is associated with impermissivism, and with an evidentialist ethics of belief, 
while James defends a (risk-limited) permissivism. 
Clifford's Principle: “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon 
insufficient evidence.” The principle as defended by William Clifford (1877) is considered a strict 
statement of an evidentialist ethics of belief. 
 
Doxastic responsibility: The kind of responsibility one has for what they believe. 
Epistemic paternalism: Any practice that interferes with the inquiry of some or all persons, without 
their consent/consultation, for their own purported epistemic health or improvement. 
Epistemic value pluralism: An axiological thesis that denies the T-monist claim that the natural aim of 
belief is truth; finding no straightforward hierarchy among epistemic goods suggests to the pluralist an 
un-unified order of values, or even a “smorgasbord” of epistemic goods. 
Epistemological axiology: The study of the aims of cognition, and the value of epistemic states 
(knowledge, understanding, belief, suspension, etc.) and standings (justified, unjustified, etc.). 
Ethics of belief: The philosophical project of providing guidance for morally and intellectually 
responsible doxa (belief, opinion), including how one should respond to recognized peer disagreement. 
The value problem: The problem, at base, of why we hold a person’s having knowledge to be more 
valuable than their having (mere) true belief. The problem introduced here with Plato’s Meno is broken 
down into several sub-problems by some contemporary epistemologists. 
Veritism or T-monism: The axiological thesis that the natural aim of belief is truth, and that epistemic 
value is rooted in holding true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. The value of truth is not grounded in 
knowledge or anything else. 
Vice epistemology: Complementary to (if not simply part of) the better-known trend of virtue 
epistemology, vice epistemology is the philosophical study of the nature, identity, and epistemological 
significance of intellectual vices. 
Virtue epistemology: The philosophical study of the nature, identity, and epistemological significance of 
intellectual virtues. The term covers a range of recent approaches which grant characterological 
concepts (including specific habits, dispositions, or strategies which constitute excellences for agents 
engaged in inquiry) an important or even fundamental role in epistemology. 
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